Nikhil Basu

The Anglophone Crisis in Cameroon: Problems and Solutions

The Norwegian Refugee Council terms Cameroon’s Anglophone Crisis the world’s most neglected crisis.³ In the midst of near-countless environmental, political, and humanitarian crises around the world, this complex sub-Saharan conflict has failed to capture global attention. The Anglophone Crisis is a civil war that is now dragging into its 5th year. It has polarized the country and broader region, fracturing a nation that was once one of the safest and most united in all of Sub-Saharan Africa. Today, with the death toll of this conflict rising past 4,000 and more than 750,000 people displaced, the Anglophone Crisis desperately needs to be resolved.²

Unfortunately, many interrelating factors are preventing a peaceful outcome. Foremost is the Cameroon government’s violent quelling of organized opposition, which has only sown discontent, and antagonism. Second – and arguably even more complex – is the crisis of leadership among Anglophone revolutionaries. The opposition no longer has a unified front and has fractured into several competing factions, which makes peace talks nearly impossible to organize and enforce. At this point, peace is difficult to imagine, much less to pursue, but there are several political and institutional steps that could help. Among the systemic solutions that have been proposed, this article will investigate and analyze the prospects of the Cameroonian government’s main options – outright military suppression or socio-political appeasement, and the prospects of a return to a federal government.

To understand the current state of Cameroon, some historical background is necessary. When Germany ceded its colony of Kamerun to Britain and France after World War I, the two Allied powers split the region, with Britain controlling the western portion and France controlling the rest.⁴ In the 1960’s, Western Cameroon lobbied for full independence, but the United Nations was insistent on institutionalizing a unified Cameroon. As a result, Eastern and Western Cameroon–previously operating under two vastly different colonial structures–compromised to form a federal democracy in which both regions would send representatives to the national government. However, Cameroon’s first president, Ahamdou Adjo, repealed this system in 1972, and he and his successor, Paul Biya, spent decades solidifying a unitary system that marginalized Anglophone needs.⁴

In response to decades of political sidelining, widespread protests broke out across Western Cameroon in 2016, with the primary demand being adequate political representation. The government’s response to this was an unmitigated disaster: extrajudicial killings of unarmed civilians and suppression of independent media reportage.² This enraged many Anglophones, who now demanded full independence under the flag of Ambazonia.

After 4 years of brutal guerilla warfare and war crimes committed against civilians by both separatist and government forces, no clear resolution looks possible. To make matters worse, de facto secessionist leader Sisuku Ayuk Tabe was arrested and handed a life sentence in a government prison in 2019 on grounds of terrorism and secession.² This split the Anglophone militias into countless factions, with little or no leadership or oversight. The present situation is one of mass confusion, indiscriminate bloodshed, and anger on all sides with no clear path to peace and reconciliation.

Surveying the recent history of this conflict, it is evident that the Cameroonian government must alter its strategy drastically if the Anglophone Crisis is going to be resolved in the near future. So far, Paul Biya’s regime has tried to quell the uprising by brute force and suppression, but this has backfired spectacularly by throwing fuel onto the flames of separatist anger. Many local and international mediators have worked hard to establish peace talks, but these either do not lead to enforceable changes, or are seen as untrustworthy or untenable by one side or the other.¹ To break this cycle, the government must switch tactics from “non-negotiation with terrorists” to genuinely committing to systemic reforms and concessions to Anglophone demands. The path of war only leads to a more-entrenched resistance, and with millions of civilian lives at stake, Biya must try other strategies.

In 2019, the government participated in a series of peace talks called the Major National Dialogue. Unfortunately, this conference accomplished nothing because separatists were barred from participating and the government would only negotiate with non-violent Anglophone groups.¹ While the government made an important political step in releasing one jailed opposition leader, Maurice Kamto, it continued to stick to outright military suppression of separatist sentiment in the western regions of Cameroon, further hardening the opposition’s stance.¹ It is clear from years of experience that trying to stamp out secessionists through brute force is simply not going to work; peace can only come through mediated discussions that allow representation from every major political actor and group.

It is crucial to note that appeasement can go too far in this situation. Full secession is untenable in the present climate as it is absolutely unthinkable to Cameroon’s current government and its supporters in the AU and EU. Separatist leaders themselves are far too disunited to adequately manage an independent state, not to mention that such a state would be surrounded by hostile neighbors in Nigeria (a close Cameroonian ally) and Cameroon. Secession would have disastrous humanitarian consequences, amplifying the government’s military response into a full-on civil war that would wreak havoc on the region. A middle ground must be found between violent suppression of Anglophone protests and full independence of the Ambazonian state. This requires the government to soften its current hardline position and begin negotiating with secessionists so that they may come to some agreement and understanding.

The first, critical step to peace is the release of Sisuku Ayuk Tabe. Without such a clear signal that the government is ready and willing to concede meaningful reforms to Anglophones, the separatists will remain divided in their demands and approaches to the conflict. By releasing Tabe, the government can ensure that separatists will coalesce around the common goal of peace and better representation, isolating the hardline elements demanding nothing short of full independence which are bolstered by government atrocities. In fact, Tabe and his supporters originally favored peaceful protest methods such as boycotts and marches to rally the Anglophone cause.² This shifted when the government declared war on the protestors and began firing on unarmed civilians during the 2016 protests. His release will also be seen as a positive, conciliatory move that the majority of Anglophones will approve of, creating a working understanding that can expand into more effective, consensual, and popularly supported, internationally mediated peace talks.

Once at the negotiating table, it seems likely that the best course of action is for both sides to compromise on a new political structure, potentially including a return to federalism. That system, with multiple states voting for representatives in national government, along with decentralization of education and the judiciary so that the British-influenced Anglophone systems can maintain independence from Francophone systems, would be critical to reaching a popular resolution.² Such a compromise would also need to be certified by the people of Southwest and Northwest Cameroon through a regional referendum, which would signify the impossibility of secession based on the people’s sentiments.

The implementation of a federated system is no easy task as it would depend on the government’s softening of their hardline stance on protest and would require agreement among the currently fractured separatist cause, Cameroon’s government – and international actors such as the US, AU, and EU – must start the process of trust-building by releasing prominent separatists from jail, beginning negotiations with secessionists, and ramping down military actions against militias. Nearly all Cameroonians can agree that the end goal in the Anglophone Crisis is an end to the violence. The way to create this effective and durable path to peace is to prove that the Cameroonian government is ready, willing, and able to listen to its people’s demands.

Endnotes

1. Bone, R Maswell, and Akem Kevlin Nkwain. “Why Has Violence Increased since Cameroon’s National Dialogue?” African Arguments, Royal African Society, 7 Nov. 2019, https://africanarguments.org/2019/10/violence-increased-cameroon-conflict-national-dialogue-anglophone/.

2. de Heungoup, Hans Marie. “Cameroon’s Anglophone Crisis: How to Get to Talks?” Crisis Group, Crisis Group, 3 May 2019, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/cameroon/272-crise-anglophone-au-cameroun-comment-arriver-aux-pourparlers.

3. Jemberg, Oda Lykke. “Meet Two NORCAP Experts Working in the World’s Most Neglected Crises.” Norwegian Refugee Council, 1 June 2021, https://www.nrc.no/expert-deployment/2016/2021/norcap-neglected-crises-list/.

4. Quinn, Nolan. “Anglophone Crisis in Cameroon Was Decades in the Making.” Council on Foreign Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, 16 Aug. 2018, https://www.cfr.org/blog/anglophone-crisis-cameroon-was-decades-making.

The Caste Struggle

South Asia

By Nikhil Basu and Sohan Gade

The caste struggle is an issue that Indian society has grappled with for centuries, well before the country’s independence. At the time of independence, two main schools of thought grounded conversations about the caste system. Gandhi championed the position that the caste system was not primarily a tool of oppression, qualifying that there were “limitations…” but had “nothing sinful” (Singh 432). On the other hand, Ambedkar supported the “total annihilation of the caste system”, advocating for Indians in lower-castes and vocalizing his distrust of the entire system (Singh 416). This debate has extended far past these leaders’ lifetimes and remains relevant to Indian society today.

To rectify the issues engendered by the caste system, the writers of India’s constitution attempted to sign equity measures into law. The constitution states that neither the “State” nor “citizen[s]” are allowed to discriminate… on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth” (Ambedkar 25). Beyond this blanket statement, the Constitution also acknowledged caste-based prejudice and attempted to push for progress by offering protections to lower caste groups or ‘scheduled castes’. It not only outlawed caste-motivated discrimination but also tried to foster caste equality through the “reservation of seats,” where “seats shall be reserved for Scheduled castes” (Ambedkar 30). The Constitution’s quota-style framework remains the most formal effort against caste-related inequities in India.

Thus far, the main type of policy measure used to improve caste equity have been quotas. In 1984, the Indian Supreme Court, “ordered a 27% quota [in government jobs] for the ‘Socially and Educationally Backward’,” indirectly referring to lower caste Indians (Raman 33). Although the lower castes gained better representation in some areas, inequities persisted in others. For example, the Supreme Court maintains only a “handful of Scheduled Caste members” (Raman 34). In addition to the judiciary, higher education also lacks lower-caste representation. Despite high-percentage quotas, “fifty-eight percent of faculty positions for SC/STs (Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes) and OBCs (Other Backward Classes) are still vacant in central universities” (Maurya 29).

While the education quotas seem progressive, they fail to address several systemic issues. Success in college can heavily rely on external factors, and the quota policies have failed to incorporate factors such as mental health and adequate housing into their framework. Dalit students were often labeled as the “quota guy[s],” as they faced many degrading stereotypes (Maurya 17). Mental health also remained an issue in the Dalit student community making up over “90% of all reported student suicides” in India (Maurya 18). Finding adequate housing during university remains yet another challenge for lower-caste Indian students. A study reported that “18% of Dalits…were rejected” compared to “0% [for] upper-caste Hindus” (Maurya 31). The quotas only exacerbate the number of challenges Dalits face, including a lack of representation in teaching, mental health challenges, and housing opportunities.

Caste equity measures are often met with strong backlash. Sometimes, leaders can exploit the quotas to reserve an excessive number of spots for lower-caste individuals. One particular example was in 1994, “when Uttar Pradesh elected a member of a lower-caste as Chief Minister” (Raman 33). The election should have been a major development for Dalit rights and caste equity. However, many people were outraged as the Chief Minister “[disproportionately] filled the ranks of the state government with [members of a lower-caste],” resulting in “strikes and riots” (Raman 33). This is not an isolated case, across India, there have been bitter conflicts over caste. In fact, there were “several bloody inter-caste uprisings in Bihar” (Raman 33). Caste tensions paint the picture of a dormant volcano, ready to explode with backlash after any policy change. Poor leadership creates mistrust in the quota system, undermining the quotas’ aims. Although their outcomes vary, affirmative action policies remain at the center of caste conflict, attempting to remedy the divisions.

Although Affirmative Action policies have allowed low-caste Indians to achieve some social mobility, the caste system has reinvented itself for a modern age, stunting child development and perpetuating health and education inequalities. Today, caste inequalities persist in education access and achievement: men and women in Scheduled Castes are twice as likely to be illiterate as their upper-caste counterparts (Desphande). Additionally, far fewer Scheduled Caste Indians receive higher education, which is now a necessary stepping stone to an upper middle-class, white collar job. These sectors are blocked off to low-caste people who cannot afford or access university.

The pandemic has disproportionately hurt low-caste Indians. Although many believe that caste is no longer a relevant distinction, and that India is a “post-caste” society, empirical evidence shows that lower-caste peoples are more deprived, less well-educated, work in more precarious environments, and continue to suffer from widespread societal stigma. There is a pervasive myth that pandemics and natural disasters are “equalizing” events, affecting all humans equally across group divides and even resolving historical inequalities (Deshpande). However, since Dalits and low-caste Indians do not have the means to social distance or practice recommended health and safety measures, they have been disproportionately harmed by COVID.

Despite decades of affirmative action to uplift low-caste and indigenous Indians, 40% of Scheduled Castes and Tribes (SC and ST) do not have a private bathroom, and 70% do not have access to soap (Mondal). These proportions are significantly lower for the Other Backward Classes and Forward Castes. It is impossible for Dalits to protect themselves against COVID-19 transmission when so many families do not have access to the most basic hygiene items.

On top of this, Scheduled Castes and Tribes are over-represented in the poorest quintile of Indian society, forcing them into low-paying, manual labor. This work is often done in the informal sector, where job security is nonexistent and daily wages are volatile and unstable. India’s informal-sector workers include street vendors, waste pickers, and construction workers. In the first month of the lockdown, SC and ST Indians – who are more heavily represented in these types of work – lost jobs at more than twice the rate of their compatriots (Deshpande). For many Dalit and indigenous families, an already precarious economic situation was thrown into chaos by the pandemic and lockdown.

One solution to caste-based, pandemic-related inequality is to strengthen job security, health care, and welfare programs for informal sector employees. This would require unionization or professionalization of informal-sector laborers. Such a movement would draw on the collective bargaining power of millions of manual laborers all across India, in the same way that B.R. Ambedkar inspired millions of Dalits to fight for their dignity decades ago.

Since independence, Indian leaders have understood that caste discrimination must be actively stamped out for the country to progress. It has proven especially pernicious, surviving decades of affirmative action policies that gave Dalits access to schooling, work, and life essentials like sanitation. A more comprehensive understanding of where caste inequalities persist (such as higher education access and middle-class, secure private sector jobs) is necessary. This will allow the Indian government to target the specific realms in which low-caste families continue to face precarity and deprivation, especially in the face of a pandemic that has thrown millions of lives into chaos and uncertainty.

Works Cited

Agoramoorthy, Govindasamy, and Minna J Hsu. “How the Coronavirus Lockdown Impacts the Impoverished in India.” Journal of racial and ethnic health disparities vol. 8,1 (2021): 1-6. doi:10.1007/s40615-020-00905-5

Ambedkar, B.R. India, Constituent Assembly of. The Constitution of India. 1950.

Deshpande, Ashwini. “How India’s Caste Inequality Has Persisted-and Deepened in the Pandemic.” University of California Press, University of California Press, 1 Apr. 2021, https://online.ucpress.edu/currenthistory/article/120/825/127/116546/How-India-s-Caste-Inequality-Has-Persisted-and.

Grinsell, Scott. Caste and the Problem of Social Reform in Indian Equality Laws. Yale Law School, 2010, https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=1383&context=yjil.

“India Coronavirus Map and Case Count.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 22 Apr. 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/world/india-covid-cases.html.

Maurya, Rakesh Kumar. “ERIC – EJ1196581 – In Their Own Voices: Experiences of Dalit Students in Higher Education Institutions, International Journal of Multicultural Education, 2018.” International Journal of Multicultural Education, vol. 20, no. 3, pp. 17–38.

Raman, Sujit M. “Caste in Stone: Consequences of India’s Affirmative Action Policies.” Harvard International Review, vol. 21, no. 4, Harvard International Review, 1999, pp. 30–34, http://www.jstor.org/stable/43648970.

Singh, Aakash. “Gandhi and Ambedkar: Irreconcilable Differences?” International Journal of Hindu Studies, vol. 18, no. 3, 2014, pp. 413–49, doi:10.2307/24713655.

Swarup, Manish. India Affirmative Action. New Delhi, India, 26 Nov. 2012.